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INTRODUCTION
Many of the arguments raised in the Respondents9response are adequately addressed in
the Appellants' initial brief to the court. There are also a number of Appellants' arguments and
authority that were untouched by the Respondents and were not refuted. The Appellants will
address these and other issues at oral argument. However, as stated below, there are ten brief
points that Appellants make in reply to the Respondents' response. They relate to facts,
authority and arguments that were misconstmed or omitted by the Respondents and deserve
clarification.

ARGUMENT
I.

SEVElf&iB&FACTS A S S E R T E D BY m S P O N D E N T S A R E DISPUTED
The Respondents reference several factual assertions in its response that are disputed by

Appellants. For instance, the Respondents make several assertions in regard to alleged purposes
of Tifani Wattenbarger (Tifani) for establishing the fixed insurance annuity accounts for her
children. (Rspdts.' Br. At 5) These assertions are based on an affidavit submitted by A.G.
Edwards' agent Gene Gillette, and cannot be relied upon by the Court because they consist of
inadmissible hearsay pursuant to the section 801 Idaho Rules of Evidence. In addition, neither
Mr. Gillette nor Tifani have been deposed or cross-examined in regard to their meetings, making
Mr. Gillett's affidavit even less reliable.
The Respondents fkrther misconstrue the controverted fact of the authenticity of the
"Custodial Account Agreement" referenced in the "IRA New Account Card" as being
"immaterial" or "legal" as opposed to a "fact&
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issue. (Respdts.' Br. At 25) The Appellants are

not arguing whether separate documents can be legally incorporated into a signed agreement, but
whether the produced "Custodial Account Agreement" is actually the document referred to in the
produced New Account Card - which is indeed a factual issue. Appellants' brief points out the
disparity between the citations of paragraphs and the fact that there is no reference in the
"Custodial Account Agreement" to the Appellants or the "IRA New Account Card.'' (Aplnts.' Br.
at 8-9.)
The Respondents have taken the stance that the mere existence of the documents means
that such documents constitute the agreement between the parties. (Rcspnts' Br. at 25) In truth,
especially where one side is attempting to incorporate an unsigned document into agreement, the
Court should consider the authenticity and origin of the documents to determine their veracity.
What is known from the record is that neither the "New Account Card" signed by Tifani nor the
"Custodial Account Agreement" were retained by AG Edward agent Gene Gillette or Tifani.'
These documents were not discovered or produced until after the initiation of the lawsuit.
(Aplnts.' Br. at 6.) Moreover, the record does not reflect the manner and method that the
respective documents were stored, other than the New Account Card was stored is some type of
electronic database. These facts (and lack tilereof) were before the district court in the form of
affidavits and were, or should have been considered, and are therefore subject to review by the
Court.

' Respondents have alleged via affidavit that Gillette had reviewed a "clearer, earlier generation copy of the New

Account Card." (Rspndts.' Br. at 29) First, the affidavit referenced by the Respondents (R. Vol. 1 at 57) does not
support this assertion. The citation simply describes the New Account Card "attached as exhibit A? (Id.)
Moreover, given the fact that the document was not discovered until well after the lawsuit was filed and after
inquiries were made to his office in regard to Tifani's file makes Gillette's claim at the very least questionable.
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Finally, the Respondents continue to errantly shift the focus of the Appellants' claims
including whether there was an agreement to arbitrate those claims to the 1993 alleged IRP,
1,

I

xed insurance annuity contracts (FIA). The

Adoption Agreemen

i agreed to arbitrate tort claims arising from the

questions before the Cou

1995 HAS, based on anallegecb@&ration clause in an IRA account in 1993 and 2) wheiher the
-application of the arbitration clause in relation to IRA accounts to claims arising from the FIAs

.

or any other "controversy" are in fact unconscionable. The emphasis should be whether in
establishing the FIAs in 1995, Tifani agreed to arbitrate her claims related to the FIAs. What
occurred in 1993 is irrelevant.
P;$IESPONDIENTSCONCEDE THAT THE DISTPUICT COURT FAILED TO APPLY
BP.
THE APPROPRIATE STANDAm OF REVIEW
Appellants note that the Respondents agree that the district court failed to apply the
summary judgment standard. (Rspts.' Br. at 7-8) Respondents cite Goodman v. Lothrop, 143
Idaho 622, 151 P.3d 8 18 (2007) as authority that such a failure is "not a reversible error."
(Rspndts. Br. at 7). However, there is no indication in the Goodman decision whether this was in
fact reversible error, probably due to the fact that neither party in the case had argued that the
district court had used an improper standard of review. Goodman at 625, 821. Instead, the parties
were arguing over what standard of review applied, which was ultimately decided by the court to
be a summary judgment standard. (Id.) Goodmap1 actually supports Appellants' position.
In the current case, the district court attempted to address the "standard of review" issue,
including requiring the parties to issue a separate brief. The Appellants' brief submitted to the
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district court argued that the summay judgment standard applied, but in the end was errantly
rejected by the district court. As agreed by the Respondents in their brief before this Court, the
district court should have applied the summary judgment standard, and did not.
This is a significant error. If the district court had construed the facts on record (or lack
thereof) in light most favorable to the non-moving party, i.e. the Appellants, the outcome would
have been different. Indeed, as specifically cited in Appellants brief, there are several
controverted facts as to whether Tifani ever agree to arbitrate the claims. The Respondents'
motion should have been denied based on these controverted facts. The Court should either
remand the case for further review pursuant to the appropriate standard, or conduct its own
review based on the evidence (or lack thereof) on record. In either case, the district court
decision should be reversed.

III. ARGUMENTS ARE WE-WISED BY WESPONDENTS THAT WERE
ADDmSSED AND MOT ADOPTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT
Curiously, the Respondents have repeated in its response brief several arguments that
were ultimately not accepted by the court. These arguments were briefed and argued by both
sides. (See Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dis. Or Alt. to Stay and Comp. Arbitr. R. Vol. I. pp.
30-51 and PI. Res. To Def. ,R. Vol. I. pp 113-126.) In particular, in justification for enforcing
the arbitration clause, the Respondents cite an anomalous Arkansas Circuit Court case in which a
father opened identical IRA accounts for both him and his children. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v.

Myrick, 195 S.W.3d 388 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004) The father refused to sign a New Account Card
containing a reference to an arbitration provision for his children that was the same as the card he
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had signed for himself. (Id.) The court nonetheless enforced the arbitration clause found in the
unsigned New Account Card. As argued in the Appellants' brief before the district court, the
facts and law in Myrick are much different than the current case. The parent and child
agreements and supporting documents in Myrick were identical. (Id.) Conversely, in this case,
the type of accounts, including the executing documents, and many of the parties are completely
different, not the least of which is that the FIA contract does not contain any arbitration clause.
Moreover, the claim in the Myrick case was contractual in nature, in that the issue was whether
A.G. Edwards was required to transfer a child's IRA account to a party in a divorce case. (Id.)
The claims in this current case deal with tort claims. In any event, Myrick is not binding in
Idaho and does not have any real parallels to this case that the district court felt was worth
considering, and should be rejected by this Court as well.
In supporting its position for the awarding of attorney fees, the Respondents cite a
California Court of Appeals case Otuy River Constructors v. Sun Diego Expressway, 70 Cal.
Rptr: 3d 434 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). This case too was extensively briefed and argued before the
district court. (See Def s Mem. R. Vol. 111pp. 192-198, Pfs. Mem. in Opp. R. Vol. 111pp. 261-

267) What Respondents fail to mention in their brief both before this Court and the district court
is that Otay is a lengthy arid detailed interpretation of California Civil Code 3 1717, a statute
with specific remedies under California law when there is a contract provision for attorney fees.
There is no statute in Idaho that is even remotely similar. Thus, this case cannot even be
considered as guidance by this Court. This too was recognized by the district court, and was not
cited as a justification for the awarding of fees.
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DETERMINATION OF THE SCOPE OF THE C O N T U C T IS A STATE LAW

IV.
ISSUE

Respondents argue that because the Federal Arbitration Act governs the arbitration
provision, the arbitration provision should be treated differently than other contracts, including
arbitration provisions that are governed Idaho's Uniform Arbitration Act. (Rspndts.' Br. at 19).
However, as reiterated time and time again in the Appellants' brief, although arbitration
provisions are favored in the law, state law governs whether the parties have agreed lo arbitrate
the claims - including the "scope of the contract." This principle was affirmed by this Court as
recently as 2007:
(S)tates apply general state law principles of contract interpretation to resolve the issue
whether the parties entered into a valid and enforceable written agreement to arbitrate,
and to determine the scope of the arbit
Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197,200 (Idaho 200
At the core of the current matter is whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the underlying claims,
including an in depth analysis of the scope of the arbitration provision - which is interpreted
according to state law. (Id,) The Appellants demonstrated in their opening brief that the
interpretation of the arbitration language, including the definition of "account" as stated in the
Custodial Account to mean an IRA account only, as according to state law is limited to the scope
of the IRA agreement and no other agreements. (Aplnts.' Br. at 17-21)
///

It is interesting to note that Respondents cite this case in support of their position, hut conveniently omit the
language in regard to the state law's application of the "scope of the agreement." (Rpndts Br. at 19)
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.

ENFORCEMENT OF THE AmIITMTBON CLAUSE CANNOT BE SOLELY
BASED ON THE CONTEUCT SERVING AS THE "ROOT OF THE mLATEONSHilBP99
There is simply no evidence to suggest that the purpose of the 1993 IRA Agreement was
to establish a "broker-client" relationship, as has also been suggested by the ~espondents.~
in
any case, the Respondents continue to misinte~pretLovey v. Regence Blueshield ofIdaho, 139
Idaho 37, (2003)to mean that arbitration would apply when "the parties have their roots" in the
contractual relationship. (Rspndts.'~Br. at 20). However, their citation refers not to the holding
in Lovey, but rather a litany of other sample holdings in other cases cited by Lovey. (Id. at 46)
In fact, the Lovey Court makes a point to note that there is danger in allowing arbitration for torts
based on the mere existence of a relationship created by a contract with the following
illustration:
For example, in Sefert v. US. Home Corp. a widow brought a wrongful death action
arising from the death of her husband from carbon monoxide poisoning when the air
conditioning system in their home picked up exhaust fumes from a car left running in the
garage and distributed them into the house. The construction contract that she and her
husband had executed with the builder contained an arbitration clause applicable to "any
controversy or claim arising under or related to this Agreement." After the builder's
motion to compel arbitration was denied, it appealed. In upholding the trial court, the
Florida Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
These allegations [of negligence and breach of the duty to warn] rely on obligations that
would extend to anyone, third parties as well as the Seiferts, who might be injured by
U.S. Home's tortious conduct. Indeed, it appears to be entirely fortuitous that it was Mr.
Seifert, and not a guest or someone else in the house, who was injured as a result of the
It is also worth noting that both sides agree that it was Gene Gillette who called Tifani to set up an appointment in
1995 after hearing about Sl~rutClement's death and not the reverse. Even if Gillelte's stated purpose that he was
simply calling to "transfer the papenvork" in the IRA accounts, given the fact that there was virtually no money in
Shan Clement's IRA account, it is clear that the real motivation for Gillette's call was to solicit business. Thus, it
was Gillette who invigorated the relationship, and not Tifani.
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alleged neglect by U.S. Home. . . .While it is certainly true that this dispute would not
have arisen but for the sales agreement between U.S. Home and the Seiferts, we conclude
that the mere existence of such contract is not suflcient to compel that this dispute be
arbitrated. None of the allegations assert that U.S. Home's duties or obligations arose
from or were governed by the contract. (Emphasis added) (Id. at 48)
To avoid this concern of overreaching, the Lovey Court distinguished duties arising out of
contractual relationship with duties that would exist regardless of the contract. Such analysis
requires a determination of whether "the resolution of (the) dispute can take place without any
reference to or construction of the contract: between the parties. " (Id.) If so, the arbitration clause
does not apply. (Id.)
In this case, the Respondents' duties to the Appellants in regard to the 1995 FIAs would
have existed regardless of the 1993 IRAAgreement. There is no need for nor is there any
reference whatsoever in Appellants' complaint to the 1993 IRA Agreement. The Appellants do
not need to establish that there was the 1993 IRAAgreement (with its accompanying arbitration
provision) in order to prove their claims. The Respondents' duties toward Appellants exist
regardless and independent of the 1993 IRAAgreement. The tortious conduct arises out of the
agent's duty in establishing the 1995 FIAs. . The 1993 IRAAgreement is irrelevant to
Appellants claims. As reiterated by the Lovey Court, the fact that the relationship was "rooted"
in the 1993 Agreement is not enough to justify the application of the arbitration provi~ion.~

An interesting situation would be presented, given the mobility of investment instnrments, if the Appellants, after
opening the 1993 IRA with the Respondent, set up the FIAs with a different company then later migrated those
accounts to the Respondent. Would they then be bound to arbitration of tort claims arising out of misadministration of the FIAs because the fo~merlyindependent FlAs somehow magically then becan~e"rootes' in
the 1993 IRA ?
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V

mSPONDENTS TAKE CONTRADICTORY POSITIONS WETH mGARD TO
THE APPLICATION OF THE FAA
At one point during their brief, the Respondents stalte the claim that arbitration provision
should be construed as according to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and federal law only
(particularly in regard to application of Lovey which would disfavor the enforcement of the
arbitration provision.) (Rspdnts.' Br. at 18-19) Later in their brief, the Respondents contradict
themselves in suggesting that state law should govern the arbitration clause - particularly with
regard to their supporting argument for attorneys fees based on the district court's dismissal of
the case (rather than staying the proceedings pending the outcome of the arbitration.) It appears
that the Respondents are being selective with regard to which jurisdiction applies, depending on
whatever suits their purpose.
Appellants suspect that the real intent is to divert the Court's attention away from the
FAA because there is no getting around the requirement of 9 U.S.C.S. § 3, which states that if the
court agrees that claims are subject to arbitration, the court shall "stay the trial of the action until
such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement." If the proceedings
are "stayed," there is no final judgment until the arbitration is completed. If there is no final
judgment, Respondents are not entitled to fees. Simply put, the district erred in dismissing the
case rather than staying the proceedings and on that basis alone the Respondents are not entitled
to their attorney fees under I.R.C.P. 54(b).
Ill
Ill
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VHI, MSBONDEWTS E W N T L P I CITE AUTHOMTPI THAT SUGGESTS 66ALE
CONTROVERSIES99INCLUDES CLAIMS BEYOND THE SCOPE @IF THE
CONTRACT
The Respondents cite three different cases suggesting that language in an arbitration
provision stating "any controversy . . . arising from events occurring prior, on or subsequent to
the execution" of the arbitration provision should apply to any such controversy outside the
scope ofthe contract. (Rspndts.' Br. at 15-16) Upon further examination of all three of the cases,
each of which contain such language, there also exists language that defines the scope for which
the arbitration provision would apply.
For instance, the arbitration provision cited in Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Services,

Inc, 346 F3d 1024 (11'~Cir: 2003)(as cited by Respondents) states that the arbitration provision
would apply to all "disputes, claims, controversies arising in connection with the Loan, Note,
Security Agreement, etc.. ."(Id. at 1028) Respondents also cite Painewebber Incorporated v.

Bybyk, 8 1 F. 3d 1193 (2ndCir. 1993). Here again, the arbitration provision refers to "any and all
controversies . . . concerning any account, transaction, dispute, or the construction, performance,
or breach of this or any other agreement." (Id. at 1199) This is yet another example of where the
Respondents have left out key elements in cases.
As evidenced by these and the many other dozens of cases that have been cited by both
parties, regardless of the broadness of the arbitration language, what must first be determined is
the scope of the actual contract that contains the arbitration provision. Just because the
arbitration provision refers to "any and all controversies" arising from "any event" does not
expand that provision beyond the scope of the contract. Appellants again refer to the numerous
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arguments it has made that prove that the claims that Respondents (and the district court) are
attempting to subject to arbitration are well beyond the scope of the 1993 IRA Agreement.

VHIII. mSPONDENTS RAVE FAILED TO mFBJTE THAT AmHTRATZBaN CLAUSES
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED SEPAWTELY FROM THE AGmEMENTS Hiel
WRPCR THEY ARE CONTAINED*
The Appellants' brief identifies three separate cases that find in part that arbitration
clauses are not to be considered a "separate contract" from within the contract or agreement that
it is contained. (Aplnts.' Br. at 22-23) Such a concept is consistent with the Federal Arbitration
Act, which states that arbitration clauses are enforceable insofar as they "arise out of such
contract." (Id.) 9 USCS 5 2
Rather than challenge this argument head on, the Respondents decided to steer the Court
into the other issues and holdings of these three cases. Appellants aclmowledge that the cases
cited are complex and address a number of issues, holdings and inapplicable fact scenarios.
Appellants also aclcnowledge that the application in which the courts came to holding that
arbitration provisions are not a "separate contract" is different that the current case.
Nonetheless, the legal principle established by these courts does have relevance to the
current case. Arbitration provisions are not separate contracts. They are to be interpreted and
considered within the context in the agreement in which they are contained. In this case, the
Respondents are attempting to separate the arbitration provision out from the rest: of the IRA
Agreement, which deals entirely with the implementation and management of the IRA accounts.
Pursuant to the legal principle of "non-separation" established in these cases, the arbitration
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clause should be construed within the context of that agreement, and not as its "own" agreement
that would apply to completely separate contracts.

PX,

WSPONDIENTS STILL MISAPPLY THE UNCONSCBONAHBPLIITY STANDAM
SET IN LOVEX
The Respondents continue to equate the facts in Lovey and the facts in the current case
with regard to procedural unconscionabili'cy. The only similarities between Lovey and the current
case is that the respective agreements with the arbitration provision are considered "adhesion9'
contracts. Beyond that there are drastic differences, including the following:
fi)

The arbitration provision contained with an IMAgreement, as applied by the
district court and Respondents, would apply to each and every dispute,
including torts and without limitation. (The arbitration provision as applied in
Lovey is restricted to claims related to the contract.)

B)

The FIAagreements that Tifani signed in 1995 for her children had no
reference to an arbitration provision or any other agreement that contained an
arbitration agreement. In addition, her agent never indicated to her that she
would be subject to such agreement. She had no notice.

c)

The arbitration provision requires a member of the New York Stock Exchange
to be one of the arbiters.

D)

Tifani had virtually no knowledge about investing money, including
investment contracts. She was young, a vulnerable widow and inexperienced
in such matters. She was completely reliant on her agent.
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Thus, the Appellants believe that it is more than appropriate to raise the public policy
issue in regard to the enforcement of an arbitration provision as it is related to consumer
protection. Although the law favors the enforcement of arbitration clauses, such enforcement
should be balanced with other public interests that are established or enhanced by statute, in
particular consumer protection. This Courl has the responsibility of weighing the interests and
drawing the line where it believes that one interest unduly impedes on the other. It must decide
whether the unfettered application of an arbitration clause in this case interferes with the state
laws that protect the consumer. This is worthwhile and important question that this Court should
pursue.
The Appellants' brief covers a number of concerns and issues with regard to arbitration
clauses on the rights of consumers in particular, i.e. the lack of safeguards, conflicts of interest
between corporate Respondents and the arbiters, and the disproportionate prevailing rate for
consumers (just 3.3% of the time.) (Aplnts.' Br. at 31-32) There continues to be a trend of states
asserting consumer protection to stop the enforcement of arbitration clauses in consumer
agreements. For instance, the State of Minnesota's Attorney General has filed a complaint
against the National Arbitration Forum, (NAF) and the Dispute Management Services, LLC
(DMS) (two major arbitration organizations) in the Fourth District Court of Minnesota. (Filed
July 14,2009) The complaint alleges that, contrary to their advertisement of "neutrality" and
"independence," the NAF and DMS are directly tied to the country's major debt collection
enterprises and are therefore incentivized to rule against consumers, and is thus a blatant
violation of the state's consumer protection and deceptive practices statute. In reaction to these
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E)

it was the agent who approached Tifani about investing her life insurance
proceeds, not Tifani seeking his services.

These are a separate set of facts deserve their own consideration in relation to the
principles of procedoral unconscionability as established by Lovey. That's the hue analysis that
should have been conducted by the district court, not a co~nparisonfrom wholly separate facts in
Lovey.
As laid out in page 26 of Appellants' brief an analysis of the facts do suggest a lack of
"free bargaining between the parties" with regard to the arbitration provision, and is therefore
procedurally unconscionable. Again, the established principles include a lack of knowledge, lack
of opportunity to study the contract, inquire about its terms, or disparity in the "sophistication,
knowledge, or experience of the parties."Lovey at 82. All of these factors are applicable to the
current case.

MATTERS IN REGARD TO THE I[NTEPWTATIBP$ OF STATUTE ARE
FREELY REVHEWABLE BY THE COURT

X.

The Appellants acknowledge that the public policy issue of consumer protection has been
first raised before this Court. However, this Court is in a special position to conduct a free
review of governing statutes of the issues on appeal, including the statute's legislative intent, i.e.
the "'language used, the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the
statute." Kelso & Irwin,PA. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134, 997 P.2d 591, 595 (2000).
That is a significant and vital part of its role, and in fact more suitable to this Court than perhaps
the district court.
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rising concerns, the American Arbitration Association has recently determined not to accept a-ny
new consunier debt collection arbitration filings. (see its press release at

htt~~:Nww1v,adr.or~lisp.asp?id=36427]
Thus, notwithstanding the long -standing judicial "favoritism" toward arbitration clause,
the Court should not be deterred from preserving other important interests in the law. It should
consider Idaho's "Unconscionable Methods, Acts, or Practices" under the "Consumer Protection
Act" as it relates to the facts of this case.

CONCLUSION
The issues in regard to this appeal are numerous and fully briefed. The Appellants urge
the Court to overturn the dismissal of their case so that they will finally be able to move fonvard
with the fair adjudication of their claims,

R

Dated: October 9,200

Attorney for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am a licensed attorney in the State of Idaho and on October 9,2009,I
served a true and correct copy of the Appellants9Reply Brief on the following individuals by
Federal Express Priority Overnight delivery:
Howard Burnett
Hawley Troxell Eniss & Nawley

Attorney for Appellants
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